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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public trials ensure that a defendant is fairly dealt with and not 
unjustly condemned, while reminding the prosecutor and judge of 
the importance of their functions.1 Though public trials are 
guaranteed in the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions,2 trial court 
judges and appellate courts are at times hesitant to enforce this 
fundamental right, leading to improper closures.3 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court recently held in State v. Brown4 that intentionally 
locking the doors of a courtroom during jury instructions does not 
implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial.5 The majority found 
that the trial court’s actions were too trivial to affect any of the 
defendant’s public trial rights.6 Because the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted the triviality doctrine, it did not apply the 
traditional test for alleged Sixth Amendment violations.7 
This case note begins by exploring the history of the right to a 
public trial in the United States.8 Next, it introduces the triviality 
doctrine.9 Then it discusses the facts of Brown and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s rationale for the decision.10 It then argues that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the triviality doctrine’s 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (noting that the 
purpose of the public trial guarantee is “for the benefit of the accused; that the 
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned” (quoting 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979))). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 3.  See Logan Munroe Chandler, Sixth Amendment—Public Trial Guarantee 
Applies to Pretrial Suppression Hearings, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 802, 809 (1984) 
(noting how the Waller court did not provide much guidance for determining 
what is an overriding interest, which “may cause trial judges to close judicial 
proceedings for reasons that do not sufficiently outweigh the strong societal 
interests weighing in favor of open trials”). 
 4.  815 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2012).  
 5.  Id. at 617–18. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See infra Part II. 
 10.  See infra Part III. 
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scope beyond its proper application.11 Next, it argues that the 
expansion blurs the analysis between trivial closures and harmless 
errors.12 Finally, this note concludes that Brown will lead to many 
unwarranted courtroom closures and advocates for a new rule: the 
triviality doctrine should only apply to unintentional closures.13 
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL 
A. Origins of the Right to a Public Trial 
The guarantee to a speedy and public trial is generally seen as 
a common law privilege originating in England.14 English judges 
consistently applied the guarantee throughout the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.15 The right was not seen as a benefit for 
the accused16 but rather as a way to reinforce the legitimacy of 
convictions.17 Though the original purpose of the public trial is not 
the same as it is today, it is often seen as an important aspect of the 
American legal system.18 As one scholar noted, “Without publicity, 
all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all 
other checks are of small account.”19  
B. The Public Trial Guarantee in the United States 
The founding fathers recognized that the public trial 
guarantee provided important safeguards to freedom and chose to 
adopt it into the Bill of Rights.20 In America, the right has 
 
 11.  See infra Part IV. 
 12.  See infra Part IV. 
 13.  See infra Part V. 
 14.  Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 381 (1932); 
see JOSEPH JACONELLI, OPEN JUSTICE: A CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL 5 (2002) 
(tracing public trials from common law England to colonial America).  
 15.  Radin, supra note 14, at 389 (“But any feature of the common law was 
sure to be noted as a merit, especially in the seventeenth century. . . . [I]n the 
eighteenth century . . . the ‘open and public trial’ of the common law [was given] 
something of an odor of sanctity.”). 
 16.  Id. at 384.  
 17.  Daniel Levitas, Comment, Scaling Waller: How Courts Have Eroded the Sixth 
Amendment Public Trial Right, 59 EMORY L.J. 493, 501 (2009).  
 18.  Compare id. (stating that no matter the original function of the public 
trial guarantee, it is hailed by many), with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 599 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that it is a 
presupposition of the American legal system that trials shall be public). 
 19.  1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827). 
 20.  See Kleinbart v. United States, 388 A.2d 878, 881 (D.C. 1978) 
(“The guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to 
3
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universally been recognized as a benefit for the accused.21 The 
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 6 
of the Minnesota Constitution confer on criminal defendants the 
right to a public trial, with identical language: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial.”22 A public trial is defined as a “trial that anyone may 
attend or observe.”23 The guarantee is not absolute 24 and at times it 
must yield to important government interests.25 According to the 
American Bar Association, all judicial proceedings must be made 
accessible to the public, unless the closure follows the proper 
procedures.26 Access is defined as “the most direct and immediate 
opportunity as is reasonably available to observe and examine for 
purposes of gathering and disseminating information.”27 
Though courts took up the issue throughout the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Davis v. United States 
provided the initial framework for modern jurisprudence.28 
The court in Davis held that alleged public trial violations were not 
harmless errors.29 Therefore, a defendant does not need to show 
 
employ our courts as instruments of persecution.” (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 270 (1948))); Radin, supra note 14, at 386 (“The [Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial] is one of the important safeguards that [was] soon deemed 
necessary to round out the Constitution . . . .” (quoting Davis v. United States, 
247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917))); Fair Trial Guarantees, 32 C.F.R. § 151.7(p) 
(2013) (citing public trials as important safeguards to fair trials). 
 21.  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)). See generally 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1542 
(2013) (noting that the requirement that criminal trials be public is for the benefit 
of the accused); SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL, 
at xviii (2006) (discussing the purpose of the Sixth Amendment). 
 22.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 23.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1644 (9th ed. 2009).  
 24.  E.g., Waller, 467 U.S. at 39; People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 
(N.Y. 1988).  
 25.  Waller, 467 U.S. at 46; see Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Problems Posed by 
Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1961) 
(discussing the need to balance defendant’s rights to a public trial and the 
government’s need to maintain secrecy in certain situations). 
 26.  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 8, § 3.2(a) (3d ed. 1992), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section 
_archive/crimjust _standards_fairtrial_blk.html#3.2. 
 27.  Id. § 3.2 (d)(5).  
 28.  Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 396–99 (8th Cir. 1917) (“A violation of 
the constitutional right [to a public trial] necessarily implies prejudice and more 
than that need not appear. Furthermore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, in 
such cases for a defendant to point to any definite, personal injury.”). 
 29.  Id. 
4
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actual harm to prevail.30 The Sixth Amendment right was applied to 
state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court case In re Oliver.31 
The right of the public and press to attend trials was not 
guaranteed until the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.32 The right was applied under the First 
Amendment.33 The plurality opinion found that there was a long 
history of open criminal trials and that the fundamental right to 
attend criminal trials was implicit in the First Amendment.34 
The U.S. Supreme Court found the closure at issue invalid because 
the “trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was 
made as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need 
to ensure fairness; [and] there was no recognition of any right 
under the Constitution for the public or press to attend the trial.”35 
Though the U.S. Supreme Court found that the public and press 
had the right to attend criminal proceedings under the First 
Amendment, it still grappled with issues of whether the same right 
applied under the Sixth Amendment.36 
C. The Waller Test 
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the broad 
courtroom closure of a seven-day suppression hearing during a 
criminal trial was unconstitutional.37 Waller v. Georgia synthesized 
prior holdings to provide a clear rule for all alleged First and Sixth 
Amendment public trial violations.38 Writing for the majority in 
 
 30.  Id. at 398–99. 
 31.  In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). 
 32.  448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).  
 33.  See G. Michael Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To 
Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 418 (noting 
that the right of the public and press to attend was first recognized under the First 
Amendment in Richmond Newspapers). Prior to Richmond Newspapers, cases such as 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that neither the public nor 
the press had a Sixth Amendment right to attend proceedings. Id.  
 34.  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575, 580. 
 35.  Id. at 580–81. 
 36.  See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381 & n.9 (noting that there is no “correlative 
right in members of the public to insist upon a public trial” and that “only a 
defendant has a right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment”). 
 37.  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). 
 38.  Levitas, supra note 17, at 518.  
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Waller v. Georgia, Justice Powell outlined the current four-part test.39 
He held that 
the party seeking to close the hearing must [1] advance 
an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, 
[2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to 
protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider 
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and 
[4] it must make findings adequate to support the 
closure.40 
The Court held that a violation of the public trial guarantee does 
not necessarily require a new trial.41 “Rather, the remedy should be 
appropriate to the violation.”42 The Court reasoned that automatic 
reversal would give defendants unfair windfalls that would not be in 
the public interest,43 but reiterated that the defendant does not 
need to show actual harm.44 
The Supreme Court recently emphasized the rigidity of the 
rule and applied it to every stage of a trial.45 In Presley v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that every closure must meet the Waller 
test.46 In the brief per curium decision, the Court stated that “[t]rial 
courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to 
accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.”47 It also noted 
that every closure must be accompanied by “findings specific 
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure 
order was properly entered.”48 The majority also held that trial 
courts must consider reasonable alternatives for every closure, even 
if the parties do not offer them.49 
 
 39.  Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at 49–50. 
 42.  Id. at 50. See generally Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 113–14 (1988) (discussing the 
appropriate remedy for Sixth Amendment violations).  
 43.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 50.  
 44.  Id. at 49 (“[T]he defendant should not be required to prove specific 
prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee.”). 
 45.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214–15 (2010) (holding that a trial 
court’s closure during voir dire violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
because the court did not take into account alternatives and did not articulate a 
specific enough finding).  
 46.  Id. at 213.  
 47.  Id. at 215.  
 48.  Id. (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)) 
(citation omitted). 
 49.  Id. at 216. 
6
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D. The Public Trial Guarantee in Minnesota 
Minnesota has generally followed the Waller test,50 though 
recent jurisprudence has allowed more opportunities for 
courtroom closure.51 Specifically, Minnesota now recognizes that 
some closures are too trivial to amount to a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.52 In accord with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, 
Minnesota also recognizes that public trial violations are not 
subject to harmless error analysis.53 
E. The Triviality Doctrine 
The triviality doctrine holds that certain courtroom closures 
are too trivial to affect a defendant’s public trial rights.54 The 
doctrine was developed from the often-cited case Peterson v. 
Williams.55 In Peterson, a courtroom was closed during the testimony 
of an undercover agent.56 The judge inadvertently forgot to reopen 
the courtroom prior to the testimony by the defendant.57 Thus, for 
fifteen to twenty minutes, the defendant testified in a closed 
 
 50.  See, e.g., State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007) (holding 
that the trial court failed to provide adequate findings for the closure as required 
by Waller); State v. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1995) (remanding the 
case in order for the prosecutor to have the opportunity to establish, if he could, 
that closure was necessary under Waller); State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 260 
(Minn. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not comply with the requirements 
of Waller). 
 51.  See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 390 (Minn. 2011) (holding 
that the values sought to be protected by a public trial are not implicated when 
some spectators are excluded from the courtroom); State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 
652, 660–61 (Minn. 2001) (holding that the closure in question was so trivial that 
it did not implicate the right to a public trial). 
 52.  See, e.g., State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 617–18 (Minn. 2012) (locking 
the doors of a courtroom during jury instructions); Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 390 
(removing the mother of the defendant and locking the doors of a courtroom 
during jury instructions); Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 660–61 (removing two children 
from courtroom during testimony of a witness).  
 53.  State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009).  
 54.  See, e.g., Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617 (discussing trivial closures); Recent 
Cases, Criminal Law—Sixth Amendment—Second Circuit Affirms Conviction Despite 
Closure to the Public of a Voir Dire—United States v. Gupta, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1072, 
1072 (2012) (noting that the closure in Gupta was too trivial to affect the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).  
 55.  85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 56.  Id. at 41–42 (protecting the identity of the undercover agent is a valid 
reason for courtroom closure). 
 57.  Id. (stating that failure to reopen was an oversight). 
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courtroom.58 When the judge became aware of the closure, she 
immediately took steps to reopen the courtroom, and the defense 
counsel repeated all of the defendant’s relevant testimony in 
summation.59 
The appellate court in Peterson did not articulate a specific test 
for determining a trivial closure, but held that because the closure 
was extremely short, followed by a helpful summation, and entirely 
inadvertent, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not 
infringed upon.60 The court found that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment public trial rights are only implicated when a closure 
affects the values protected by the right.61 In trivial closure cases, 
there are no actual closures for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment.62 Thus, trivial closures are not subject to the Waller 
test.63 
1. Scope of the Triviality Doctrine 
Because the Waller test involves weighing a number of different 
interests, “[t]he precise contours of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment public trial rights are ill-defined.”64 There is no 
specific test for reviewing a closure to determine whether it is 
trivial. A recent Florida case presented a helpful three-part 
framework to facilitate appellate review.65 First, a court should 
determine whether the public trial guarantee extends to the part of 
the trial in question.66 Second, a court should determine whether a 
closure actually occurred for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.67 
Lastly, if there was a closure, a court should determine whether the 
closure met the Waller test and was therefore valid.68 The first issue 
is generally not in dispute, as the U.S. Supreme Court in Presley 
summarily stated that the Waller standard applies to every stage of a 
 
 58.  Id. at 41. 
 59.  Id. at 42–43.  
 60.  Id. at 44. 
 61.  Id. at 43–44. 
 62.  State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 617 (Minn. 2012) (noting that certain 
actions by trial courts are not considered “true closures”).  
 63.  See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43–44. 
 64.  United States v. Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2012).  
 65.  Id. The majority in Brown followed a similar analysis, though it did not lay 
out an explicit three-part framework. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 1302. 
 68.  See id. 
8
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trial.69 The last issue is often contested but is not the focus of this 
note.70 The second issue—determining whether a closure occurred 
for Sixth Amendment purposes—is where the triviality doctrine 
comes into play.71 If an appellate court finds that the trial court’s 
actions were de minimis or trivial, then there is no closure for 
purposes of this analysis.72 If there is no closure, then there is no 
constitutional violation and no need to proceed to the Waller test.73 
Courts are reluctant to make a specific test for determining 
whether a closure is trivial.74 Instead, the determination is a fact-
intensive issue for each case.75 Because there is no set rule, 
jurisdictions across the country have addressed the issue 
differently.76 Some courts are extremely hesitant to broaden the 
scope 77 or even adopt the doctrine,78 while others have used it to 
allow for more judicial discretion in courtroom closures.79 
 
 69.  Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010). 
 70.  See, e.g., Hoi Man Yung v. Walker, 468 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the trial court did not make findings adequate to support closure); 
Sevencan v. Herbert, 342 F.3d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the closure was 
necessary to protect an overriding interest). 
 71.  See Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (discussing whether the closure was 
so insignificant that it did not constitute a closure). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that 
because the defendant’s Sixth Amendment public trial rights were not violated, 
there was no need to proceed further). 
 74.  See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Whatever the outer boundaries of our ‘triviality standard’ may be . . . we see no 
reason to define the[m] . . . .”); Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44. See generally John M. Walker, 
Jr., Foreword, Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 395, 
403–04 (1997) (discussing the different factors that can be used for determining a 
trivial closure).  
 75.  See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44.  
 76.  See generally H.D. Warren, Annotation, Exclusion of Public During Criminal 
Trial, 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945) (discussing triviality cases from different 
jurisdictions). 
 77.  Gupta, 699 F.3d at 688 (“We have repeatedly emphasized, however, the 
[triviality] doctrine’s narrow application.”). 
 78.  See State v. Lormor, 257 P.3d 624, 630 (Wash. 2011) (“While this court 
has occasionally suggested that a closure might be trivial or de minimis, we have 
not yet been presented with a case or facts that warrant the adoption of this 
rule.”); State v. Easterling, 137 P.3d 825, 831–32 (Wash. 2006) (noting that a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Washington has never found a public trial right 
violation to be de minimis).  
 79.  See, e.g., People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (N.Y. 1988) (holding 
that it is within trial court’s discretion to monitor admittance to the courtroom 
and therefore not a closure). 
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The doctrine is most often cited in cases involving unintentional 
closures for short periods of time.80 
F. Harmless Error Framework 
Throughout the early twentieth century, appellate courts 
routinely overturned convictions for seemingly meaningless trial 
court errors, such as omitting the word “the” from a charging 
indictment.81 Any technical error often resulted in an automatic 
reversal.82 This led to many decisions that gave men and women 
convicted of crimes unfair loopholes to get their cases overturned.83 
In 1919, Congress sought to combat this problem.84 Rule 52(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that “[a]ny error, 
defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial 
rights must be disregarded.”85 This rule was seen as a way to 
substitute the harsh “automatic reversal” rule in favor of appellate 
court judgment.86 Congress hoped to preserve judicial resources 
and improve public confidence in the criminal trial process by 
preventing parties from gaming the system by purposely “sowing 
reversible error in the record.”87 The harmless error rule is meant 
to apply to errors that are merely technical and do not obstruct the 
fair determination on the merits of the case.88 Only when an error 
affects substantial rights is remedial action available.89 
Prior to 1967, all fifty states had some form of a harmless error 
rule, though the rule did not apply to federal constitutional error.90 
 
 80.  Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1076 (2012) (citing United States v. 
Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 874 (2d Cir. 2011) (Parker, J., dissenting)) (finding that in 
eighteen cases in which a voir dire proceeding was closed to the public but found 
too trivial to implicate the defendant’s public trial rights, many involved an 
inadvertent closure).  
 81.  James Edward Wicht III, There Is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional 
Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73, 73 (1997).  
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 77 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759–60 (1946)) 
(discussing the policy reasons behind Congress’ decision to pass the harmless 
error rule).  
 84.  Id. at 73. 
 85.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).  
 86.  Wicht, supra note 81, at 77.  
 87.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 49 (1967) (“[C]riminal trial[s] 
became a game for sowing reversible error in the record.”). 
 88.  11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 103.02 
(4th ed. 2012).  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Wicht, supra note 81, at 79. 
10
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In Chapman v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court first 
acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, violations of the 
defendant’s constitutional rights could qualify as harmless error.91 
For the next twenty-five years, courts interpreted Chapman, each 
jurisdiction applying harmless error to some rights and not to 
others.92 During this time period, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
only five instances, in addition to the examples specifically listed in 
Chapman, in which constitutional error was reversible per se 93: 
abridgment of the right to self-representation,94 abridgment of the 
right to a public trial,95 unlawful exclusion of members of the 
defendant’s race from a grand jury,96 failure to assure an impartial 
jury in a capital case,97 and appointment of an interested party’s 
attorney as a prosecutor for contempt charges.98 In 1991, the U.S. 
Supreme Court sought to provide a general rule for determining 
whether a particular constitutional violation was subject to a 
harmless error analysis.99 
In Arizona v. Fulminante, a defendant was incarcerated in New 
Jersey on a felon in possession of a firearm conviction.100 In return 
for protection from other inmates, the defendant confessed to an 
Arizona murder to a paid informant of the FBI.101 Using the 
confession, the defendant was convicted of the murder and 
sentenced to death.102 The Arizona Supreme Court held that a 
harmless error analysis was inappropriate for an alleged coerced 
confession and that the confession was coerced due to the 
 
 91.  See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 (noting that all fifty states at that time had 
some form of a harmless error rule and that the Federal Constitution should 
receive similar treatment).  
 92.  See David McCord, The “Trial”/”Structural” Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and 
Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1997) (noting that the Chapman 
decision created two major interpretational issues). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984). 
 95.  See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984). 
 96.  See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986). 
 97.  See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987). 
 98.  See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809–14 
(1987). 
 99.  McCord, supra note 92, at 1401 (noting the Chapman court created a 
purported bright-line rule for applying different analyses based on whether a 
structural or trial error occurred).  
 100.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 282 (1991). 
 101.  Id. at 283. 
 102.  Id. at 284. 
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psychological pressure the informant placed on the defendant, and 
ordered a new trial.103 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the 
harmless error analysis applies to alleged coerced confessions.104 
In his opinion, the Chief Justice attempted to create a bright-line 
rule to guide future decisions.105 The majority held that each 
constitutional violation is characterized as either a structural error 
or a trial error.106 Structural errors are reversible per se, while trial 
errors are subject to a harmless error analysis.107 Trial errors occur 
during the presentation of evidence to the jury and therefore may 
be assessed in the context of other evidence presented to the 
jury.108 Structural errors affect the entire framework of the trial 
proceeding.109 The majority found that an involuntary confession 
was a trial error and thus subject to a harmless error analysis.110 
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the confession was 
coerced and that the defendant must get a new trial.111 
The right to a public trial is considered a structural error and 
would normally be reversible per se.112 In Waller, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the remedy must be appropriate to the violation.113 
Thus, a defendant does not need to show harm to prevail, but he or 
she is also not entitled to automatic reversal.114 Minnesota has 
followed this rule and does not apply a harmless error analysis or 
an automatic reversal to public trial violations.115 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 296.  
 105.  McCord, supra note 92, at 1410–11. 
 106.  Id. at 1411.  
 107.  Id. at 1401. 
 108.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08.  
 109.  Id. at 310.  
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  See id. at 309–10.  
 113.  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984). 
 114.  See id. 
 115.  See State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 259–61 (Minn. 1992) (discussing 
Fulminante and other U.S. Supreme Court precedent to determine that public trial 
violations are not subject to harmless error analysis or automatic reversal). 
12
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III. THE BROWN DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
On August 29, 2008, Darius Miller was shot and killed outside 
Whispers Gentlemen’s Club in Minneapolis.116 The State charged 
Jerrell Michael Brown with first-degree premeditated murder, first-
degree premeditated murder committed for the benefit of a gang, 
second-degree intentional murder, and second-degree intentional 
murder committed for the benefit of a gang.117 
The State presented evidence that just prior to the murder, 
three of Brown’s acquaintances attacked Miller.118 During the fight, 
someone yelled, “You better go get a gun.”119 Immediately 
preceding the gunshots, an eyewitness reported seeing an 
individual wearing a white undershirt and a large necklace, with his 
hair in a ponytail, come up the club stairs.120 The State introduced 
jail security camera footage that showed Brown leaving jail twelve 
hours before Miller’s murder, with his hair in a ponytail and 
wearing a large necklace, white tank top, and dark pants.121 
Additionally, the State presented evidence showing that a car seen 
near the murder scene was registered to the sister of one of 
Brown’s acquaintances.122 The State had an expert testify that a 
bullet casing, recovered from a shooting that Brown pleaded guilty 
to in 2008, matched that of a casing found near Miller’s body.123 
Following closing arguments, the trial court ordered the 
courtroom door be locked for the duration of the jury 
instructions.124 To explain the situation, the judge stated on the 
record: 
For the benefit of those in the back. I am going to 
begin giving jury instructions. While that is going on the 
courtroom is going to be locked and people are not going 
to be allowed to go in and out. 
 
 116.  Appellant’s Brief at 10, State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2012) 
(Nos. A10-0992, A11-1293), 2011 WL 8479012, at *10 [hereinafter Appellant’s 
Brief]. 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614.  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 612, 614. 
 124.  Id. at 614. 
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So, if anybody has to leave, now would be the time. 
You are welcome to s[t]ay. But I just want to make sure 
that everybody knows that the courtroom is going to be 
locked. We are all good? Deputy?125 
For the duration of the jury instructions, no spectators were let in 
or allowed out of the courtroom.126 The jury found Brown guilty on 
all four counts of murder.127 The trial court sentenced him to life 
imprisonment for first-degree murder, plus an additional year of 
imprisonment because the murder was committed for the benefit 
of a gang.128 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
After the sentence, Brown filed a direct appeal to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.129 Before the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, Brown argued that he was entitled to a new trial for five 
reasons.130 The court addressed issues of admissibility of evidence, 
jury instructions, testimony, impeachment evidence, and the right 
to a public trial.131 The court ruled in favor of the State on all five 
issues.132 This note focuses on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in regards to the public trial issue. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that denials of the 
public trial guarantee constitute structural error and are not 
subject to harmless error review.133 The court then addressed the 
purpose of the public trial guarantee, citing the Waller standard.134 
The court explained that “[n]ot all courtroom restrictions 
implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial.”135 The court focused 
on two recent Minnesota decisions, which found that certain 
closures can be “too trivial to amount to a violation of the [Sixth] 
Amendment.”136 The court cited several factors for determining 
that the trial court’s actions were trivial, including that the 
 
 125.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 126.  Id. at 614–15.  
 127.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 116, at 8. 
 128.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 615.  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  See id. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Id. at 616 (citing State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009)).  
 134.  See id. at 616–17.  
 135.  Id. at 617.  
 136.  Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
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courtroom was never cleared of all spectators; the trial remained 
open to the general public and press; there was no period of the 
trial in which members of the general public were absent; and at no 
time was the defendant or his family excluded.137 Thus, the court 
found that locking the courtroom doors did not implicate Brown’s 
right to a public trial.138 
Writing for the majority, Justice Page also cautioned that the 
act of “locking courtroom doors during jury instructions creates the 
appearance that Minnesota’s courtrooms are closed or inaccessible 
to the public.”139 The majority concluded by noting that in future 
cases, the “better practice” is for the trial court to expressly state on 
the record why it locked the courtroom doors.140 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The majority erred by finding that locking a courtroom is too 
trivial to implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
First, this section discusses the act of locking the doors of a 
courtroom. Second, this section discusses the scope of the triviality 
doctrine, specifically addressing what is considered a closure. Then 
it discusses intentional actions by trial courts and whether the 
triviality doctrine should apply. Though public trials are not subject 
to harmless error analysis, this section argues that Brown blurs the 
line between trivial closures and harmless errors. This section 
concludes by arguing that the triviality doctrine should be applied 
only to inadvertent closures and discusses the implications of the 
Brown decision on future courtroom closures. 
A. Locking the Courtroom During Jury Instructions 
Locking a courtroom’s doors during jury instructions is a 
relatively common procedure in state courts.141 The practice 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 617–18 (“[T]he courtroom was never cleared of all spectators . . . . 
The trial remained open to the public and press already in the courtroom . . . . 
[T]he jury instructions did not comprise a proportionately large portion of the 
trial proceedings.”).  
 139.  Id. at 618.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  See, e.g., id. at 614; People v. Venters, 511 N.Y.S.2d 283, 283 (App. Div. 
1987) (“[D]efendant has raised a serious constitutional and statutory challenge to 
the practice, almost universally applied in criminal trials conducted in this State, 
of automatically closing and locking the courtroom doors during the Judge’s 
charge to the jury.”); Nicholas A. Pellegrini, Extension of a Criminal Defendant’s Right 
15
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prohibits spectators from entering or leaving the courtroom during 
the entirety of the jury instructions.142 This type of closure has been 
justified as a “time honored” tradition that seeks to avoid jury 
distraction during a critical phase of the trial.143 This portion of the 
trial is of vital importance because a jury must understand all of the 
legal issues prior to entering deliberations.144 Thus, trial judges lock 
the doors in order to maintain the jury’s attention.145 
The majority in Brown did not explicitly discuss the role of 
discretion by trial court judges, though it appears to give deference 
to the trial court judge’s decision.146 Additionally, other courts in 
trivial closure cases have explicitly noted that they defer to the trial 
court judge’s discretion in matters of maintaining decorum.147 
Limiting the scope of trivial closures would not take away discretion 
from trial court judges.148 Rather, it would require the judge to 
follow the Waller test whenever he or she attempted to close or lock 
 
to a Public Trial: Access to the Courtroom During the Jury Charge, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
277, 279 n.9 (1987) (discussing a survey conducted by two attorneys that found 
that approximately half of the jurisdictions in the country lock the courtroom 
during jury instructions).  
 142.  See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614–15 (noting that the courtroom would be 
locked until the jury instructions were complete). 
 143.  People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 1079–80 (N.Y. 1988); Venters, 
511 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (“[C]ourtroom closure during the charge in a criminal case, 
however hoary and time honored such a practice may be, does not pass 
constitutional or statutory muster.”). 
 144.  See Colon, 521 N.E.2d at 1079 (“The charge to the jury is a solemn and 
comparatively complex phase of the trial requiring precision and concentration 
on the part of both the jury and the Trial Judge.”).  
 145.  See id. 
 146.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614 (noting that the reason for the closure 
according to the trial judge was for the “benefit of those in the back” and not 
going further into the reason behind the locking of the courtroom).  
 147.  See, e.g., Davidson v. State, 591 So. 2d 901, 902–03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) 
(finding it is generally recognized that judges have the discretion to lock the 
courtroom during jury instructions); People v. Hughes, 657 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 
(App. Div. 1997) (finding that it was within the trial judge’s discretion to lock the 
courtroom); RENZO D. BOWERS, THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURTS: 
A TREATISE FOR TRIAL JUDGES AND TRIAL LAWYERS § 262, at 296 (1931) (recognizing 
the inherent power of the trial court to preserve order and decorum in the 
courtroom). 
 148.  See William K. Meyer, Note, Evaluating Court Closures After Richmond 
Newspapers: Using Sixth Amendment Standards to Enforce a First Amendment Right, 
50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 304, 308 (1982) (stating that “[w]hen a judge has discretion 
to exclude the public from a criminal proceeding, he must balance the policies 
favoring closure against competing interests,” but discretion is allowed unless the 
closure extends “beyond [its] necessary scope”). 
16
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the courtroom.149 Thus, when there are valid reasons to close the 
courtroom, the trial court judge would have discretion to maintain 
order and decorum.150 
B. Too Trivial to Affect the Defendant’s Rights: How the Minnesota 
Supreme Court Applied the Triviality Doctrine in Brown 
The majority in Brown found that locking a courtroom’s doors 
does not implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial, though it 
acknowledged that future closures of this type would “create[] the 
appearance that Minnesota courtrooms are closed or 
inaccessible.”151 In Waller, the U.S. Supreme Court noted “‘the 
great, though intangible, societal loss that flows’ from closing 
courthouse doors.”152 The closure at issue in Brown is directly akin 
to the harmful closure described in Waller.153 The majority erred by 
applying the triviality doctrine to this type of closure.154 The 
majority should have found that the trial court’s closure implicated 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and remanded the case 
for further proceedings to determine whether the closure satisfied 
the Waller test.155 This case note does not argue for or against the 
overall merits of the defendant’s public trial claim. Rather, it 
argues that Minnesota courts should not classify such closures as 
trivial and should apply the Waller test to every intentional 
closure.156 
 
 149.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213–14 (2010) (reaffirming the 
application of the Waller test to every closure).  
 150.  Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (discussing the 
ability of trial court judges to comment on the facts of a case and noting that a 
judge’s “discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exercised 
in conformity with the standards governing the judicial office”).  
 151.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 618 (cautioning that “the act of locking courtroom 
doors during jury instructions creates the appearance . . . [of] closed or 
inaccessible” courtrooms, so courts should proceed with caution).  
 152.  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (quoting People v. Jones, 
391 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (N.Y. 1979)). 
 153.  Compare id. at 42 (closing the courtroom for a suppression hearing), with 
Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614 (locking courtroom during jury instructions).  
 154.  See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617–18.  
 155.  See id. at 627 (Meyer, J., dissenting).  
 156.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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1. The Triviality Doctrine’s Expanding Scope in Minnesota 
The majority in Brown relied heavily on the analyses of two 
Minnesota cases.157 In State v. Lindsey, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that excluding two minors from observing a criminal 
trial “was not a true closure, in the sense of excluding all or even a 
significant portion of the public from the trial.”158 The trial court in 
Lindsey relied on a Minnesota statute 159—which the Minnesota 
Supreme Court ultimately ruled unconstitutional—to exclude the 
two children.160 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that excluding 
“two children of unknown age and unknown relationship to [the 
defendant]” did not violate his right to a public trial.161 Though 
Lindsey addressed trivial closures, because it involved the removal of 
specific members of the public whereas Brown involved a general 
locking of the courtroom, its facts are distinct enough that the 
Brown majority should have delved further into the purpose behind 
the triviality doctrine.162 
The Brown majority also cited State v. Caldwell.163 The public 
trial portion of Caldwell involved two issues: excluding the 
defendant’s disruptive mother and locking the courtroom doors 
before jury instructions.164 The Caldwell court applied the limited 
holding of Lindsey to the broader, intentional locking of the 
courtroom without considering the issue further.165 Though the 
Caldwell court applied the triviality doctrine to locking a 
courtroom’s doors, the opinion did not devote much analysis to the 
issue.166 Additionally, the Caldwell majority’s reasoning might not be 
consistent with controlling precedent. The Caldwell court stated 
that the “‘values sought to be protected by a public trial’ are 
protected when not all spectators are excluded from the 
 
 157.  See 815 N.W.2d at 617. 
 158.  632 N.W.2d 652, 660 (Minn. 2001). 
 159.  MINN. STAT. § 631.04 (2000). Though the Lindsey court declared the 
statute unconstitutional, it has never been repealed by the legislature and thus 
remains in the law. See MINN. STAT. § 631.04 (2012). 
 160.  Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 659. 
 161.  Id. at 661. 
 162.  Compare Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614–15 (locking courtroom to all 
spectators not yet in attendance), with Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 657 (removing two 
minor spectators). 
 163.  803 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2011).  
 164.  Id. at 390. 
 165.  See id. 
 166.  See id. (devoting only seven sentences to both public trial issues). 
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courtroom.”167 Though this statement is right in certain 
circumstances, many courts have held a closure does not need to 
exclude all spectators to violate the Sixth Amendment.168 The 
Caldwell majority also noted that “‘a trial court may, in the 
appropriate exercise of its discretion, exclude spectators when 
necessary to preserve order in the courtroom.’”169 Again, this may 
be true in certain circumstances.170 But if in the exercise of 
discretion a trial court judge implicates a defendant’s public trial 
rights, as would be the case if a judge excluded all spectators as the 
majority noted in Caldwell, the judge must make adequate findings 
to satisfy the Waller test.171 Because the two Minnesota cases cited in 
Brown are distinct and not in sync with precedent, the majority 
erred by not delving further into the purpose and scope of the 
triviality doctrine.172 
2. Different Types of Closures and Their Effect on a Trivial Closure 
Analysis 
As the Peterson court noted, for a violation of the public trial 
guarantee to occur, there must be a closure.173 There is no single 
definition of what is considered a closure for Sixth Amendment 
 
 167.  Id. (quoting Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 661).  
 168.  See, e.g., Smith v. Hollins, 448 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
the exclusion of the defendant’s brother and sister violated his Sixth Amendment 
public trial rights because the trial court judge failed to make “requisite 
particularized findings”). See generally H. H. Henry, Annotation, Exclusion of Public 
During Criminal Trial, 48 A.L.R.2D 1436 (1956) (discussing cases from multiple 
jurisdictions holding that a closure does not need to exclude the entire public in 
order to violate the Sixth Amendment).  
 169.  Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 390 (quoting State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 458 
(Minn. 1993)). 
 170.  See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213–16 (2010) (finding that it 
was a violation to exclude the public from the courtroom, even though the judge 
believed it was within his discretion).  
 171.  See id. While the trial court judge argued that it was “totally up to [his] 
discretion whether or not [he] want[s] family members in the courtroom to 
intermingle with the jurors,” the U.S. Supreme Court argued the trial judge did 
not satisfy the Waller test prior to closing the courtroom by failing to consider 
alternative options. Id. 
 172.  See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 626 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s reasoning was flawed and the actions of 
the Lindsey court were distinguishable).  
 173.  See Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42–44 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that an 
inadvertent closure of the courtroom did not violate defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights). 
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purposes.174 To complicate matters, most jurisdictions recognize 
two types of closures: total and partial.175 A total closure occurs 
when “all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties 
and their lawyers [are] excluded for the duration of the hearing.”176 
Identifying a total closure is straightforward, though disputes have 
arisen over how long a complete exclusion of the public must occur 
to be considered total.177 Recognizing a partial closure is not as 
clear.178 A partial closure occurs when only some members of the 
public, whether a class of people or specific individuals, are 
excluded.179 Some jurisdictions define a partial closure generally as 
“[w]hen access to the courtroom is retained by some spectators” 
but denied to others.180 This definition would appear to include 
locking a courtroom. Those currently in attendance would retain 
access, while those spectators not yet in attendance would be 
denied access. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “close” as 
“restricted to a particular class.”181 Again, this definition appears to 
include instances where a courtroom is locked from persons not yet 
in attendance, though some courts, such as Brown, have held 
otherwise.182 
In jurisdictions that distinguish between total and partial 
closures, the partial closure is held to a lesser standard.183 While a 
 
 174.  Levitas, supra note 17, at 534–35 (noting that courts define closure 
differently).  
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted) 
(citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 42 (1984)).  
 177.  See Levitas, supra note 17, at 535 (discussing Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 
1315 (11th Cir. 2001), and noting the dispute over whether a total closure for a 
temporary time period can be considered a partial closure).  
 178.  See Rachel G. Piven-Kehrle, Annotation, Determination of Request for 
Exclusion of Public from State Criminal Trial in Order to Preserve Safety, Confidentiality, or 
Well-Being of Witness Who Is Not Undercover Police Officer—Issues of Proof, Consideration 
of Alternatives, and Scope of Closure, 32 A.L.R.6TH 171 (2008) (discussing issues of 
partial and total closures among different jurisdictions). 
 179.  State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 624 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing factors that can determine whether a closure is partial). 
 180.  E.g., Haley, 250 F.3d at 1315.  
 181.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609 (Nos. A10-0992, 
A11-1293), 2011 WL 8479014, at *3 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 254 
(6th ed. 1990)). 
 182.  See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617–18; People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 
1078–80 (N.Y. 1988) (“Defendant’s premise, however, that locking the courtroom 
doors during the charge to the jury results in a ‘closure’ of the proceedings, does 
not withstand analysis.”). 
 183.  See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he impact of the partial closure did not reach the level of a total closure, and 
20
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total closure must be justified by an overriding interest, partial 
closures only need a substantial interest to be valid.184 The rest of 
the procedural elements of the Waller test apply, so the trial court 
must articulate its reasoning, consider alternatives, and make the 
closure no broader than necessary.185 
Minnesota does not recognize the distinction between total 
and partial closures.186 Therefore, whenever a closure occurs and 
“a court intends to exclude the public from a criminal proceeding, 
it must first analyze the Waller factors and make specific [enough] 
findings with regard to those factors.”187 This may complicate cases 
such as Brown, because the closure would need to meet the higher 
“overriding interest” standard.188 Other courts have held that 
locking courtroom doors is a closure for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, yet still ruled the closure valid.189 But these jurisdictions 
also recognize the distinction between partial and total closures.190 
Thus, a judge may have a substantial interest for locking the 
courtroom doors during jury instructions, though it is not clear 
whether it would be an overriding interest.191 
This case note does not specifically advocate for or against 
Minnesota courts’ recognition of partial closures. Rather, this note 
argues that because Minnesota does not recognize the distinction, 
it may have affected the Brown decision and the reliance on the 
triviality doctrine. Courts are reluctant to order new trials or 
remand cases on solid convictions for relatively minor violations.192 
 
therefore ‘only a “substantial” rather than a “compelling” reason for the closure 
was necessary.’” (quoting Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 
1984))). 
 184.  See, e.g., Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
first Waller factor requires only a ‘substantial’ interest [in] justifying the courtroom 
closure, rather than a ‘“compelling” interest.’” (quoting United States v. DeLuca, 
137 F.3d 24, 33–34 (1st Cir. 1998))); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753–54 (10th 
Cir. 1989). 
 185.  Levitas, supra note 17, at 538. 
 186.  See State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007) (declining to 
adopt the substantial reason test for partial closures). 
 187.  United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Brown, 
815 N.W.2d at 625 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (“If the actions taken by a trial court 
implicate the public trial right, a trial court must apply the Waller standards before 
excluding the public . . . .”). 
 188.  See Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 685. 
 189.  See United States v. Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302–03 (S.D. Fla. 
2012). 
 190.  See id.  
 191.  Id. at 1302–03. 
 192.  See Levitas, supra note 17, at 497 (noting the “understandable reluctance 
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In Brown, the closure would likely not meet the high threshold for 
courtroom closures.193 But if Minnesota did recognize partial 
closures, the case may have been remanded and the verdict would 
have been affirmed, without relying on the triviality doctrine.194 
3. The Closure in Brown Analyzed 
The triviality doctrine allows closures that do not undermine 
the “values served by the Sixth Amendment.”195 These values, 
derived from Waller, are: “1) to ensure a fair trial; 2) to remind the 
prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the 
importance of their functions; 3) to encourage witnesses to come 
forward; and 4) to discourage perjury.”196 The third and fourth 
values are likely not implicated during jury instructions because the 
trial has been completed, and the focus of the proceedings is 
between the judge and the jury.197 Thus, “[t]hese values . . . do not 
weigh either in favor or against a triviality finding.”198 
The first and second values should have been the focus of the 
trivial closure analysis in Brown. The first value is meant to ensure 
that the defendant is fairly dealt with and that the proper 
procedures are followed.199 The second value is an effective 
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.200 As Justice Meyer 
 
of some appellate courts to reverse convictions of appellants who appear obviously 
guilty”). 
 193.  Compare State v. Sanders, 719 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(discussing why there was no overriding interest for the courtroom closure and 
noting that “[t]here is little evidence that supports the claim that there was an 
adverse atmosphere in the courtroom”), with State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 
626–27 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (noting that nothing in the record 
indicated that there were previous issues with spectators causing distractions or 
creating an adverse atmosphere).  
 194.  Compare Levitas, supra note 17, at 497 (reluctance to overturn solid 
convictions), with Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (locking the courtroom 
affirmed as a partial closure). 
 195.  Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 196.  Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1984)). 
 197.  Cf. Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
third and fourth values served by Waller were not implicated during voir dire 
because no witnesses were testifying at that time). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See Danny J. Boggs, The Right to a Fair Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2 
(1998) (noting that “the right to a fair trial . . . is the property of the defendant” 
and that “our society and our Constitution generally have made the judgment that 
the measure of a fair trial is its adherence to stated processes”). 
 200.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 n.4 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 
(1948)).  
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correctly stated in her dissent, intentionally locking the doors of a 
courtroom goes against the values of the Sixth Amendment.201 
Justice Meyer listed several relevant factors to consider in 
evaluating these values, including the “length of the closure, the 
people excluded from the courtroom, the subjects discussed during 
the closure, whether the trial court intended the closure to occur, 
and the justifications given by the trial court for closure.”202 
In order to determine whether the closure implicated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, Minnesota courts should 
follow a similar analysis as Justice Meyer presented in her dissent.203 
For Brown, the jury instructions took up a relatively small portion of 
the trial.204 But the subject matter discussed during the instructions 
is of vital importance.205 Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, 
neither the subject matter nor the length of time for the closure is 
conclusive. The trial court judge did not give a reason for 
intentionally locking the courtroom, which weighs against finding 
the closure to be trivial.206 If the majority in Brown had delved 
further into the rule and followed a similar analysis as Justice 
Meyer, it would have likely found that the closure was not trivial 
and remanded the case. 
C. Advocating for an Alternative Rule: Applying the Triviality Doctrine 
Only to Inadvertent Closures 
This note advocates for a simpler rule: Minnesota courts 
should not apply the triviality doctrine to intentional closures. 
Other courts are in disagreement about the implication of judicial 
intent for courtroom closures.207 Some courts have questioned the 
 
 201.  State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 626 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he values of the public trial guarantee are sufficiently implicated under the 
facts of this case such that a Waller analysis is required.”). 
 202.  Id. at 624 (citing United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2005); Peterson v. Williams, 
85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 203.  See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 624. 
 204.  See id. at 618 (majority opinion) (“In addition, the jury instructions did 
not comprise a proportionately large portion of the trial proceedings.”). 
 205.  See Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 697 
(2000) (discussing the crucial role of jury instructions). 
 206.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614.  
 207.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Quinones, 211 F.3d 735, 737–38 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“In Peterson, the problematic closure occurred as the result of the accidental 
failure to reopen after a properly ordered closure, whereas here the door was 
intentionally locked by court personnel . . . . In view of these differences, we do 
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applicability of Peterson to intentional courtroom closures.208 The 
Peterson court itself acknowledged that it was ruling specifically on 
inadvertent closures and not other types of closures.209 It also noted 
that an “intentional (not inadvertent) improper closure could 
threaten a defendant’s right to a fair trial, even when the closure is 
for a brief time . . . .”210 The triviality doctrine is most often cited in 
cases of accidental or inadvertent closures.211 In general, 
courtrooms should be closed in only the most limited set of 
circumstances.212 Because the triviality doctrine is an exception to 
the general rule of protecting public trials, it should be “applie[d] 
only rarely and to truly trivial closings.”213 Undisclosed exclusions of 
the public from trials “without the knowledge or assent of the 
accused . . . seriously undermine[] the basic fairness of a criminal 
trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public 
confidence in the system.”214 
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to 
follow an analysis similar to Waller for all closures.215 Locking the 
 
not believe the closure can be considered so ‘trivial’ . . . .”); Kelly v. State, 6 A.3d 
396, 407 n.10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“Some courts do consider whether the 
closure was inadvertent. Other courts find this factor irrelevant to the analysis.”); 
State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 162 (R.I. 2004) (“[The closure] was neither brief nor 
inadvertent, but was an intentional restriction . . . . Under these circumstances, the 
appropriate relief is the granting of a new trial.”). But see Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 
431, 433 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Whether the closure was intentional or inadvertent is 
constitutionally irrelevant.”); State v. Vanness, 738 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2007) (holding that the state’s intent is irrelevant, so when the courthouse was 
locked for three hours without the judge’s knowledge, it was still a closure).  
 208.  See Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 529, 541 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is unclear 
from the analysis in Peterson whether [the intentional closing] would alter the 
conclusion that ‘no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.’” (quoting Peterson v. 
Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1996))); Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44 n.8 (questioning 
whether an intentional closure may threaten a defendant’s public trial right, even 
if the closure is brief). 
 209.  See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 n.4 (noting that even though the defendant 
cited three cases in support of his argument that the closure was improper, 
“[n]one of them discusses inadvertent or negligent closures at all”).  
 210.  Id. at 44 n.8. 
 211.  See United States v. Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 874–75 (2d Cir. 2011) (Parker, 
J., dissenting) (discussing cases of trivial closures during jury selection and noting 
that most involved inadvertent closures), vacated, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1076 (noting that in many instances, the triviality 
doctrine is used in inadvertent closures). 
 212.  See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984) (stating that there is a 
presumption of openness in trials). 
 213.  Gupta, 650 F.3d at 874.  
 214.  Id.  
 215.  See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02, subdiv. 4(4)(c), (e) (stating that there must 
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courtroom doors, when the Minnesota rules governing closures 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court precedents are clear, creates an 
appearance of unfairness and a closed judiciary.216 Trial court 
judges who exclude some members of the public without following 
the proper analysis are ignoring clear precedent and creating an 
appearance of unfairness in the judiciary; this act goes against the 
values protected by the public trial guarantee and should be 
considered a closure for constitutional purposes.217 
Requiring trial court judges who intentionally close the 
courtroom to outside spectators to follow the Waller test promotes 
fairness and confidence in the judiciary.218 By using the triviality 
doctrine only in a limited set of circumstances, Minnesota would 
more closely follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent.219 As the 
U.S. Supreme Court noted in Press-Enterprise, the value of openness 
that a public trial guarantees “lies in the fact that people not 
actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of 
fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free 
to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being 
followed and that deviations will become known.”220 Limiting the 
scope of the triviality doctrine would provide appellate courts a 
better opportunity to review the case and promote public 
confidence in the judiciary.221 Applying the triviality doctrine only 
 
be an overriding interest for the closure, the closure must be no broader than is 
necessary, the judge must consider reasonable alternatives, and the judge must 
make findings of fact on the record). 
 216.  See State v. Brown 815 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2012) (“[W]e caution that 
the act of locking courtroom doors during jury instructions creates the 
appearance that Minnesota’s courtrooms are closed or inaccessible to the 
public.”). 
 217.  Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing that the 
second value is to remind the judge of his or her responsibility and the 
importance of his or her function).  
 218.  See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (noting the societal 
benefits of spectators learning more about government and gaining confidence in 
the judiciary); Levitas, supra note 17, at 529 (finding that the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Waller and In re Oliver incorporated the public trial right based on fairness 
principles).  
 219.  See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215–16 (2010) (reinforcing the 
rigidity of the Waller test on courtroom closures). 
 220.  Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (emphasis in 
original).  
 221.  Compare Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 618 (aiming to maintain confidence in the 
judiciary and facilitate appellate review), with United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 
689 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 687) (finding knowledge that 
anyone is free to attend a trial inspires confidence), and Levitas, supra note 17, 
at 509–10 (noting that the elements of Waller create a “suitable record for 
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to inadvertent closures would prevent the slippery slope of which 
the majority seems wary. 
D. Blurring the Line Between the Triviality Doctrine and a Harmless 
Error Analysis 
The triviality doctrine, as an exception to the traditional rules 
for public trial violations, should be used only in a limited set of 
circumstances,222 though the Brown court expanded it to intentional 
closures.223 With this expansion, the court further blurred the 
analysis between trivial closures and harmless errors.224 
The Brown court correctly stated that “[d]enials of the public 
trial guarantee constitute structural error not subject to harmless 
error review.”225 But later in the majority’s decision, the court noted 
that “nothing in the trial court or postconviction court record 
provides factual support for any claim that any particular person 
was denied entrance.”226 The latter statement leaves open the 
question of whether the decision may have come out differently if 
the defendant had proven that specific spectators were excluded. 
The two statements by the court indicate different lines of 
reasoning that complicate the analysis for future decisions in 
Minnesota. 
1. Tension Between Trivial Closure Analysis and Harmless Error 
Analysis 
Courts have recognized the tension between trivial closures 
and harmless errors.227 In explaining how the triviality doctrine 
differs from a harmless error analysis, the Second Circuit stated 
that “[t]he inquiry is not whether the defendant suffer[ed] 
 
appellate review”). 
 222.  United States v. Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 874 (2d Cir. 2011) (Parker, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 223.  See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 618.  
 224.  See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Beyond Harmless Error: ‘Triviality’ 
of Intrusions, 237 N.Y. L.J., July 3, 2007, at 3, available at LEXIS (discussing the 
expansion of the triviality doctrine and harmless error ranging from public trial 
issues to restrictions on communications between client and counsel). 
 225.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 616 (citing State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 
(Minn. 2009)). 
 226.  Id. at 618 n.5. 
 227.  See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1072 (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
application of the triviality doctrine and the tension it has with U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent). 
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‘prejudice’ or ‘specific injury.’”228 Rather, regardless of whether the 
defendant is guilty or innocent, the court determines whether the 
defendant was deprived of protections provided in the Sixth 
Amendment.229 Similar to the Brown court’s analysis, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the focus of the trivial 
closure analysis is on what transpired during the closed 
proceedings, not the impact on the overall outcome of the trial.230 
Focusing on what actually occurred during the proceeding is 
misguided because the openness of the proceeding itself, 
regardless of what actually transpired during the closure, is what 
promotes the appearance of fairness in the judiciary.231 
Though the triviality doctrine focuses on the rights of the 
defendant and not his overall guilt or innocence, deciding which 
errors are “so small that they do not warrant reversal inevitably 
invites fears of a ‘slippery slope,’ and comparison with the 
‘harmless error analysis’ used for trial errors.”232 As the majority in 
Waller noted, the benefits of a public trial are often intangible, yet 
great.233 So, just as it is difficult to point to specific prejudice for a 
harmless error analysis,234 it is also difficult for a defendant to point 
to specific facts that prove that the values behind the public trial 
guarantee were implicated.235 Because the benefits of public trials 
are often intangible, courts may have difficulties properly weighing 
the harm and benefit of a closure.236 
In determining whether a closure is constitutional, courts do 
not look for actual harm because it is difficult for the defendant to 
 
 228.  Id. at 1073–74 (quoting United States v. Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 867 
(2d Cir. 2011), vacated, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012)) (second alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229.  Gupta, 699 F.3d at 688 (quoting Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42 
(2d Cir. 1996)). 
 230.  Compare Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617–18 n.5 (noting that no one in the 
defendant’s party was improperly excluded and that the defendant could not 
point to anyone who was actually denied admittance), with Recent Cases, 
supra note 54, at 1076–77 (quoting Gupta, 650 F.3d at 869) (requiring the 
defendant to point to evidence showing that his rights were affected).  
 231.  Gupta, 699 F.3d at 689.  
 232.  Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Structural Errors in Criminal 
Trials, 242 N.Y. L.J., July 29, 2009, at 4, available at LEXIS. 
 233.  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984). 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1077 (discussing the effect of 
requiring defendant to prove harm on the defendant’s rights).  
 236.  See Wicht, supra note 81, at 93–94 (arguing that appellate courts cannot 
effectively weigh the impact of a constitutional error). 
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prove.237 Instead, appellate courts focus on whether the trial court 
met its obligations before the closure.238 But when determining 
whether a closure is trivial, part of a court’s analysis looks for the 
defendant to show that his or her public trial rights were 
implicated.239 By looking for a tangible piece of evidence to weigh 
for or against a trivial closure, courts are inching closer to a 
harmless error analysis.240 When noting that the defendant did not 
show that any spectators were actually denied admittance, 
Minnesota courts are requiring a defendant to prove something 
that the law and precedent say he or she should not have to 
prove.241 By applying the triviality doctrine only to inadvertent 
closures, Minnesota courts would limit the tension between the two 
analyses. When these two analyses become blurred, courts are 
limiting the application of a defendant’s fundamental right.242 
E. Brown’s Expanding Role in Allowing Courtroom Closures During 
Jury Instructions and Other Trial Proceedings 
At the end of the public trial section in the Brown opinion, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court appears to acknowledge that its new 
precedent “creates the appearance that Minnesota’s courtrooms 
are closed or inaccessible to the public.”243 Thus, the court draws on 
the Waller test and suggests that future courts expressly state the 
 
 237.  See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1075–76 (noting that a defendant does 
not need to show actual prejudice to prevail).  
 238.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48–49 (stating that the four-part test focuses on the 
actions of the judge prior to the closing). 
 239.  See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1076 (noting two criteria for analyzing 
trivial closures, and stating that courts look to see “whether any specific event 
occurred during the closure that undermined the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
protections”).  
 240.  Id. at 1078 (discussing Gupta and finding that the analysis is “very similar 
to a harmless error inquiry”).  
 241.  See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (noting the defendant does not need to 
show actual harm).  
 242.  Compare Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1077 (“This erosion of the 
defendant’s ability to remedy a violation is exacerbated by the fact that the 
remaining avenue—asking whether anything significant occurred—requires 
appellate courts to have access to information that will often be unavailable.”), 
with Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (having a defendant show prejudice “would in most 
cases deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be 
difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of specific 
injury” (quoting United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir. 
1969)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 243.  See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2012). 
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reasons for the closure on the record.244 But the Brown court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision, which lacked any articulated 
reason for the closure.245 Therefore, the Brown decision sets a very 
low threshold for courtroom closures and leaves open questions for 
how future decisions will be addressed.246 There is a strong 
potential that “creeping courtroom closure[s]” may become 
commonplace in Minnesota courts.247 
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision relied on Brown 
to uphold a locked courtroom for the stated reason that “[g]oing 
in and out [during a proceeding] obviously creates some 
disruptions and distractions.”248 Another post-Brown case affirmed a 
closure for the stated reason of “[i]t’s just a tradition.”249 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in response to the defendant’s 
argument that Brown advocates for a limited application of the 
triviality doctrine, noted only that “[w]e do not encourage or 
condone closing and locking courtroom doors during trial. . . . 
[W]e highlight Brown’s reference to the ‘better practice,’ but 
conclude it does not require reversal here.”250 While the majority in 
Brown hoped to limit the application of closures without expressly 
stated reasons on the record, it is clear that the standard practice in 
Minnesota courtrooms is to lock the doors during jury instructions 
without any qualified reason. 
Not only has Brown been cited to allow courtroom closures 
during jury instructions, the Minnesota Court of Appeals cited the 
case to uphold locking the courtroom during closing arguments.251 
 
 244.  Compare id. (“To facilitate appellate review in future cases, we conclude 
the better practice is for the trial court to expressly state on the record why the 
court is locking the courtroom doors.”), with Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (“The interest 
[for the courtroom closure] is to be articulated along with findings specific 
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was 
properly entered.” (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984))).  
 245.  Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 625 (stating on the record that the closure was “for 
the benefit of those in the back”). 
 246.  See Rosenberg, supra note 232 (discussing the tensions between the 
triviality doctrine and automatic reversal for structural errors). 
 247.  State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 609 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
 248.  Id. at 600. 
 249.  State v. Richmond, No. A12-0899, 2013 WL 1942995, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 13, 2013).  
 250.  Id. at *6.  
 251.  See State v. Lane, No. A12-0833, 2013 WL 2459894, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 
June 10, 2013). 
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The Brown decision was also cited to allow a courtroom to be 
locked during individual questioning of jurors regarding their 
exposure to potentially prejudicial material during trial.252 The 
exact scope of Brown’s precedent is unclear, but recent 
jurisprudence indicates that it will be used to expand the triviality 
doctrine to other parts of a trial. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with the difficult 
question of determining whether intentionally locking the doors of 
a courtroom before jury instructions violates a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.253 The majority determined that the trial 
court’s actions were too trivial to be considered a closure, and 
therefore the defendant’s rights were not implicated.254 Though 
locking the courtroom is a relatively common procedure, and may 
be constitutional in certain circumstances, the majority failed to 
properly analyze the purpose and scope of the triviality doctrine 
when it was applied to intentional closures. The decision further 
muddies the analysis between trivial closures and harmless errors, 
running afoul of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court should have limited the scope of the triviality 
doctrine and applied it only to inadvertent closures. Though the 
majority attempted to put in checks for future cases, Brown sets a 
very low standard that will lead to many unwarranted courtroom 
closures.255 
 
 252.  See State v. Trautman, No. A12-0929, 2013 WL 2301796, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 28, 2013). 
 253.  See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2012). 
 254.  Id. at 618. 
 255.  See State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 608 n.1 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, 
J., dissenting) (“[D]uring the 2011–12 term, [the Minnesota Supreme Court] 
denied five petitions for review that challenged the district court’s decision to 
close or lock the courtroom doors during final jury instructions.”). 
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